

## THE GREAT MUTINY OF THE SEPOYS—EXTRACTS FROM ANGLLO-INDIAN JOURNALS.

Nearly three weeks have elapsed since our last dispatch, during which time the British Indian authorities have been passing through the most dangerous crisis which has been subjected since the days of Clive. During the hundred years which have elapsed since the battle of Plassey it has grown from a province to an empire, and though only gained by hard and almost incessant fighting, our rulers have evidently been lulled into the belief that what was won by the sword might be maintained by red tape. They have shut their eyes and their ears to all that was passing round them; those who have disturbed their quiet by unpleasant tidings have received reproof, instead of thanks, and after open mutiny had broken out in the army no effective measures were taken for its suppression. The men who were detected in conspiring to take Fort William, and those who stood by while their officers were cut down at Barrackpore, were allowed to escape upon some technical formality, instead of being taken and executed. Almost to the last moment the government has publicly proclaimed its belief that a large portion of the Bengal army consists of loyal and faithful soldiers, when it is notorious that many of those who have not mutinied have been kept to their duty by fear alone, and if they still render an unwilling obedience, are not deserving of the slightest confidence.

It is too soon either to speculate on the future or to inquire into the cause of this very general revolt. It is certainly not of two or three origin, but it is traced to the Mohammedan families, who have thought this a favorable opportunity to regain their authority. The cartridge affair was for them a lucky accident, as it roused the fanaticism of the Hindu soldiers, previously discontented and complaining.

Let us shortly point out the state of the regular part of the Bengal army, far as is known at present. The 19th regiment, having mutinied at Barrackpore, was followed by disbanding the seven companies of the 34th stationed at that place. Next, the 7th cavalry mutinied at Meerut, and marching to Delhi, united with the 38th, 54th, and 74th. The wing of the 9th, whose loyalty was hoisted, seized the treasury at Allahpur, and turned out their officers. This, though a small station, was important, as it interrupted the line of communication with Meerut and the hill stations. The 45th mutinied at Lucknow, and we are not certain that they have not joined by a part at least of the other two regiments there. The 45th at Ferozepore have certainly mutinied, and been put down like those at Lucknow by the determination of the officer in command. It is also known that the 11th cavalry, native in all, at Peshawar, have been disbanded by Brigadier Beed. They consist of the 21st, 24th, 27th, 51st, and 64th regiments; but we have yet no particulars. Here is a list of some fourteen or fifteen regiments which are either in open revolt or extinct as troops. Can the rest be depended upon? We deliberately answer, in spite of their professions, No.

From the Hindu Patriot, May 21.

How slight is the hold the British government has acquired upon the affections of its Indian subjects has been made painfully evident by the late mutiny. The chief portion of the physical strength of the government have, for some time, been in mutiny, open or concealed. It is no longer a mutiny, but a rebellion. Perhaps it will be said that all mutinies, when they attain to a certain measure of success, rise to the rank of a rebellion. But the recent mutiny of the Bengal army has one peculiar feature—they have from the beginning drawn the sympathy of the country. The sepoys, who, in accepting service under the British government, neither relinquished the rights of citizenship nor abrogated national feelings, have been treated as a body of mercenaries. They have rebelled against the authority which they have sworn to obey, and the foremen men are deemed by their countrymen justified in sacrificing a moral obligation to a paramount one. They have hazarded all their most valuable interests; and their countrymen view them as martyrs to a holy cause. The great national Congress, the first time, have been joined and aided by the civil population; they have hastened towards the ancient capital of the country, where resides the remnant of the former dynasty, to which are turned in times of political commotion the eyes of all Indian nationalists.

There is not a single native of India who does not feel the full weight of the grievances imposed upon him by the very existence of the British rule in India—grievances inseparable from subjection to a foreign ruler. There is not one among the educated classes who does not feel his prospects circumscribed and his ambition reduced to naught by the supremacy of the British rule. At the present moment the conviction is ineradicably strong in the mind of every native—save the small circle in Bengal of those who have been indoctrinated into the mysteries of European civilization—that the British government is actuated by a fixed purpose of destroying the religion of the native races, and of converting them into Christianity.

From the Friend of India of May 21.

The cause.—The mail which left Calcutta on Tuesday last may be expected to reach England on the centenary of the battle of Plassey, and our countrymen will be full to mutiny at the circumstance. The tidings carried by the Alma will prepare them to expect that the kingdom which was won in a day has been lost for a time by a turn of events almost as rapid; and that in 1857 we may have again to conquer Bengal with none but Englishmen for our army, and for our Clive a master of art and war. But there will take comfort in the thought of consulting to a certain class of predators, that India has been royally spent, and that all have had a share in dissipating the rich inheritance. The people's House of Commons have scarcely ever bestowed a thought on Hindoostan; cabinets, whether whig or Tory, have sent out men to rule over us, just as before, or to interfere and be damned. The favorite of the army has seldom had a chance against the favorite of the court, and hence it is, that at the close of a century we have to begin a new career in the East, without money and without friends, backed only by our strong right hand and indomitable hearts. Be it as it may, the task before us is a heavy one, the laborers asking only for a competent overseer.

At this moment we are literally without a native army in Bengal. There is not a single Sepoy regiment that can be relied upon of the few that take the pains to make a show of loyalty. Every party of armed men is against the British rule, and the very life of Britain, and have hitherto fought our battles. Rumor had it, though erroneous, that the governor-general had felt it necessary to take precautions against personal capture, and the merchants of Calcutta propose the formation of a volunteer force for the protection of the city. The British government has no European corps that perform the double duty of soldiers and policemen, there is not the most remote doubt that Fort William would not be in the hands of mutineers, and Lord Canning either a prisoner or a fugitive. Meanwhile Delhi is held by six thousand rebels, who obtain daily access to the strength, and are said to have proclaimed a king. These causes of crime have been without a check, and, as may be feared, they should melt away before the avenging force can get at them, the example will have a most demoralizing effect. In that case it will be shown that murder is as easy as mutiny, and that wealth as well as license may be enjoyed by the sword. We have the sword fortune to serve under the present successor of Sir Charles Napier. But we hope that they have rather chosen to play at the game of king-making, and aim at the expulsion of their former masters from the soil of India, for it will be better to employ the sword than the gibbet—to destroy them in the breach or the base rather than in the midst of a sentence of courts martial. But if they shrink from the doom of no quarter, the government have but one course to pursue, in mercy to the unarmed population. They must offer a reward for every mutineer, dead or alive—a thousand rupees for the head of an officer, and a hundred for that of a sepoy. As their hand will be against every man, no every man's hand must be against them. The war waged against wolves and tigers is too merciful for ravishers and murderers such as these.

The origin of the mutiny we trace to various causes, each of which demands the closest scrutiny. For Sepoys, as well as for English soldiers, discipline must always have a certain force, and before a salute of obedience, however slight, could be broken, and advantages dearly prized be put to hazard, a powerful influence must have been long at work. The sense of individual wrong, the hope of individual gain, or a feeling of sympathy for the victims of oppression may in any part of Europe turn the soldier into a rebel, but we may put the latter motive wholly aside where Bengal Sepoys are concerned. These men have been, and will continue to be, the willing tools of power, no matter how it was acquired, or in what way it was exercised. They have no regard for deposed Rajas, no pity for tortured ryots. The word patriotism has no place in their vocabulary. The leopard may refuse for a time to hunt for its former master, but not for any kindly feeling towards the helpless deer. It might be hard for us to make out a claim to be considered the friends of the Indian peasant, but the Sepoy is his hereditary enemy, in whose eyes the gains of industry are always a lawful prey.

The notoriously relaxed state of military discipline forbade the idea that ill usage has anything to do with the revolt. The general regulations for the government of the army have been so constantly modified of late years in favor of the Sepoy that scarcely a trace of subordination remains in practice, and but little of it in theory. Commanding officers have gradually been deprived of the power of interfering except in cases of extremity, and from headquarters comes the constant admonition to treat him tenderly and with exceeding care. There may, of course, be isolated instances of regimental harshness, but we have now to deal with an army of mutineers, and it is beyond possibility that military grievances should be heavy or general. Perhaps fifty thousand men are ripe for rebellion, but we may rely upon it that the evil they complain of is one that affects them as men and not as soldiers. It is something that they feel deeply and universally.

That agents of sedition may be at work to improve the mutiny, and to excite the army, but cannot be traced to the Sepoy is on some points, it would not be possible to persuade him that he should profit by exchanging the company's service for that of any native or foreign power. The bribe of a month's pay to the Bengal army would exhaust the hoards of most of the independent rulers, and the millions may be expected to put up with a little war with the British government; and if neither love of country, the sense of personal wrong sustained by them in their capacity as soldiers, nor the prospect of individual gain lie at the bottom of the mutiny, where are we to look for the cause? What is it that animates vast masses of men, and causes them to act in concert? Religious motives? The question admits of only one answer. Religious motives have prompted the revolt, and contempt for the power of government has made it an accomplished fact. The war against authority is sanctified in the estimation of Hindu and Mussulman.

So much pains have been taken by the Indian government to disavow all connexion with missionary efforts that the most bigoted and ignorant of Hindus could hardly suspect them of even a leaning towards Christianity. Piety has never been popular with the court of directors, who are not in all respects an inconsistent body of rulers, but it has strangely enough happened that the Sepoys have been enabled, as they fancy, to discern a political motive of vast weight and influence for the destruction of caste, both in the case of Hindus and Mussulmans. It will be recollected that during the Russian war the government were frequently counselled in the public prints to make the Indian army available in the struggle. Sometimes it was suggested that regiments should be sent to the colonies to relieve the Queen's troops, and on other occasions that cavalry and artillery should be landed in the Crimea, the one arm to take outposts duties, and the guns to be brigaded with the royal artillery. By degrees the notion took root that the Russians would be victorious unless the Sepoys could be made use of in Europe; the latter result involving, of course, the previous annihilation of caste. The Persian war and the outbreak at Canton deepened the prevailing impression that Sepoy aid was indispensable in localities where they must starve or be exterminated. The Sepoys, being a body of men, and this powerful race, it was not long before the subtle Asiatic intellect discovered the supposed method by which they sought to accomplish their object. The employment of force was out of the question, and neither bribes nor persuasion would induce the devout masses to pollute themselves. It was suggested that they should be kept in secret, and to carry it out in every station and camp as simultaneously as possible. The production of a new rifle, involving the use of a new style of cartridge, afforded the very means requisite for the success of the plot. It was dipped in cow's grease for the Hindus, and pork fat for the Mussulmans. Every man must lie before loading, and once his lips had touched the matter of the gun he was forever, and he was the bond slave of government, degraded in this life and ruined in the next. This is no mere hypothesis of ours as to the main source of Sepoy discontent; it is founded upon native statements and earnest inquiry, and we believe that each succeeding day will stamp it more and more.

It is more than probable that, under a commanding officer who knew his duty and took care to perform it, the signs of discontent would have been confined to a small area. The Sepoys would have allowed the explanations of government their due weight, and in time have owned their folly. But the folly they had committed had come to such a pass that it was the fact of mutiny, and not the pretext for it, that they cared about. They had become so insubordinate that outbreak was inevitable; only what would have been a slight emendation under Sir Charles Napier's regime, to be repressed on the spot with merciless vigor, became, under Sir George Alcock, a military rebellion of such dimensions as to threaten the safety of our eastern empire. If it could be put down by calculation of the long odds, skill in phreatic shooting, or a profound knowledge of horsemanship, we might hope to be carried easily through the crisis, the supremacy of the highest military authority could be found when his services were in request; but a review of the policy of government affords no ground for supposing that, even if industrious, he has capacity enough for the post. It is not delay alone, but imbecility and vacillation, that is justly complained of; not that the right thing is not done at the right time, but that it is not accomplished at all. General Anson may not despair of the country, but the country despairs of General Anson.

Naturalists have a story of a horse who once overcame a lion in single combat, and after afterwards was unequal to mortal combat, and was put to death. The story is a fable, but it is a fable which might be applied to the present. The 28th regiment refused to embark for Burmah, and escaped without punishment, the horse overcame the lion, and the lesson has not been forgotten. Government in that case committed the fatal error of omitting to enforce obedience to its mandates, on the ground that the order ought not to have been issued. The Sepoy, allowed to choose for himself as to what portion of the commands of his superior shall be obeyed, is naturally led one day to take a step in advance, and then to another, and so on, until he has reached a point where he cannot retreat. A government which cannot commit no breach of faith to its soldiers is mischievous as that which it commits to the public when it issues a command to be disregarded. Had the order to the 38th to go to Burmah never been issued, or never disobeyed, it is not likely that at this moment their lives would be forfeited to justice.

If it were possible to retain the present organization of the Bengal army, we should feel bound to suggest some mode by which the pernicious home influence to which such officers as General Anson owe their appointments could be neutralized, but it will be of less consequence for the present, that the commander-in-chief of India should understand the native character, and the fatal error of omitting to enforce obedience to its mandates, on the ground that the order ought not to have been issued. The Sepoy, allowed to choose for himself as to what portion of the commands of his superior shall be obeyed, is naturally led one day to take a step in advance, and then to another, and so on, until he has reached a point where he cannot retreat. A government which cannot commit no breach of faith to its soldiers is mischievous as that which it commits to the public when it issues a command to be disregarded. Had the order to the 38th to go to Burmah never been issued, or never disobeyed, it is not likely that at this moment their lives would be forfeited to justice.

From the Phoenix of May 20.

Were it not for the number of gallant men and helpless women and children who have been foully murdered, we do not hesitate to say that we should not regret that the present mutiny has occurred. The result was never for a moment doubtful, but it must now be evident to even the most apprehensive that the Indian government has no strong to be met by its own army, no matter how large a number of sympathizing dacoits and jail-birds may make common cause with the Sepoys. The result of the present disaffection, if some very glaring mistakes are not made by those in power, is in reality to render the British power in India stronger and less assailable than it has ever hitherto been. The Russian statesmen, bent on the invasion of this country, were to rack invention to devise a means of crippling the power and destroying the prestige of Great Britain in India, they could not hit upon any plan calculated to create more serious embarrassment and greater dismay than that of tampering with the Sepoy regiment. And yet those regiments have been tampered with—tampered with to some purpose, too, as is evident from the general disaffection of the Sepoy army. The dreaded mutineers themselves demand increased pay, not because they have been mere squabblers for trivial concessions. They have not mutinied on account of the

greasy cartridges, nor because they considered that government was endeavoring to make Christians of them, though each and every one of these causes has been assigned by themselves as that which has incited them to revolt. On the contrary, each and every one of those causes has been but a plausible pretence. They declared they would not use the greasy cartridges; but no greasy cartridges were ever issued to them. They went further than this, and refused to use the cartridges they have been using for the last century; they were treated with a leniency which many people think was unjustifiable. In fact, there cannot exist a doubt that their resolve and intent was to upset the government of India, and to murder and slaughter every European in the country. To effect these numerous and treacherous objects, they have done their very best; done all they were capable of doing, and the result has been—what?—a result which, though as yet in the womb of time, will assuredly be their own condign punishment, if not the destruction of every man, woman, and child in the country. And when that punishment or destruction, whatever it may be, shall have been consummated, what will be the policy of the government of India? Is every bloody occurrence of the past month then to be forgotten? Are new Sepoy corps to be raised on the old plan? Are those regiments which did not become openly mutineers, because they were afraid to become so, to be retained in the service? Are such bodies of men as are considered less trustworthy than Sikhs, who were opposed to us in fair and open fight but a few years back, to be retained on the strength of the army? Or is the holder and wiser policy to be pursued of completely reorganizing the native army—wrecking it of all its subjects, and reconstructing its regiments upon a model which will not allow of mutiny. A better or fairer opportunity for the initiation of such a course of reformation policy could not be than the coming humbling of the Sepoy. The Sepoy will be the position of malcontents who did all they dared to do, and whose treason was baffled and put down without any extraordinary effort. Their ungodly-like spirit of combination will then no longer dare to show itself. It will not, however, have ceased to exist. It will continue to exist, and will be the cause of all the mischief that has hitherto followed with Sepoys in kept in constant play to prevent its reappearance. A step towards the building up of such system has already been taken—we allude to the governor-general's late order regarding native courts-martial. Much more than this is, however, required. We must at least have, beside numerous other innovations, the following:

**The abolition of promotion by seniority.**  
**The power of dismissing Sepoys from the service vested in commanding officers.**  
**The introduction of low-caste men, as in the Bombay army.**  
**The appointment of European Sepoys, and the introduction of a company of Sepoys, and the introduction of the barracks system.**

Should such a system fairly carried out be one of the results of the present mutiny, and the increase of the European army another, Lord Canning will be able to lay the flattering unction to his soul that during his administration the Sepoy will be a more useful and more obedient subject than ever it has been.

## THE GENERAL JACKSON GOLD BOX.

The joint committee of both boards of the common council of New York, which was appointed some time ago to select the person most worthy to receive the gold box that was presented to Gen. Andrew Jackson, by the authorities of that city soon after his elevation to the presidency, and at his death left by him to that person who should be adjudged to have been the most valiant in defense of his country's rights, have at length concluded their labors, and decided that this gift of inestimable value should be given to Lieut. Col. Garrett Dyckman, of the New York regiment, which served in the Mexican war. The following communication, signed by a number of gentlemen, was received by the committee, and in which are embodied the grounds upon which the conclusions of the committee are based:

**GENTLEMEN:** The undersigned, in claiming in behalf of Lieut. Col. Dyckman the gold box left by Andrew Jackson, do not so on the grounds that he was the bravest man in the New York regiment, or that his gallantry in the war with Mexico was unparalleled to the exclusion of every other soldier in that war, nor on the plea of his military position as one of the first officers of the first regiment New York volunteers, but on the ground of his having performed as many deeds of bravery and daring, and added as much honor by his services to the escutcheon of his State, as an other man engaged in the war; to the truth of which we proudly refer, without the fear of contradiction, to the following specifications.

First. For having, from the landing at the Island of Lobos to the final surrender of the city of Mexico, been the best disciplined company in the regiment, the men being always under the most thorough command and control.

Second. For leading his company on the first Sunday after the landing at Vera Cruz as skirmishers on the sand plains, near its walls, and taking position on the Orizaba road, holding that position while under fire from nearly all the batteries of the city—within hearing of the enemy—until after dark, when ordered to retire behind a sand hill.

Third. For his having taken on the succeeding evening possession of the Orizaba road, and judiciously posting pickets, thus preventing all communication from that road to the city during that night.

Fourth. For having taken a position with his company of twenty-eight men in ambush, and within half a mile of the city, to prevent the enemy from sending reinforcements to the city—the enemy, as before noticed, could be distinctly heard giving orders—and for performing constantly in his company scouting duty around the walls and roads of the city during the same time.

Fifth. For having engaged and sustained a charge from six hundred of the heaviest artillery, and being relieved by Col. Ward B. Burnett, at Vera Cruz.

Sixth. For gallant service, equal to any other man or officer, at Cerro Gordo.

Seventh. For leading his company in a charge at Cherubusco, and remaining in advance of his command under the sharpest fire of musketry experienced during the war, where he fell severely wounded, thus setting an example of bravery for his men to emulate.

Eighth. For devoting his time and attention to the discipline, comfort, and interest of his men.

Ninth. In never saying to his men "Go," when there was a chance for a brush with the enemy, but always saying "to the front," to prevent the enemy from either or private of his company to be in advance of him in action, or in any other duty where he was in command.

Tenth. For receiving the endorsement of his brother officers, both senior and junior, of his conduct as a brave soldier and officer and gentleman, by electing him from the position of a junior captain to that of major.

Col. Dyckman is quite a young man, and refused to put in his claim until the committee, induced by the testimony of numerous witnesses, waited upon him and urged him to make application. He finally did so, and the result has been that he has received one of the greatest marks of honor a soldier could possess.

The snuff box, which is valued at \$1,000, is now in the hands of Andrew Jackson, Jr., of Tennessee, who proposes bringing it to New York himself. It will probably be presented to Major D. by the committee, in front of the City Hall, on 14th September, when the golden military are expected to be out, a banquet given, and rather a splendid affair made of the proceeding.

Lord Althorp, who arrived in a late steamer, intends, we understand, making an extended tour in America. He will go to the head of Lake Superior, to Canada, and visit the northwestern States, and after the warm weather returned his visit to the slave States. His lordship was returned to the House of Commons on the liberal ticket at the late election for Northamptonshire, where the interest of his father, Earl Spencer, is predominant. Though quite young, having come of age about a year since, he has already been known for his interest in the reformatory and educational movements in England, and especially in his own county; and one of the chief objects of his visit to America is to examine into the operation of our public-school system, and our various penal and reformatory institutions. Lord Hervey will, we learn, probably make a shorter visit; but is engaged in the same inquiries. Lord Hervey is not, as stated in some of the papers, a younger son of the Marquis of Bristol, but the eldest son of the Marquis, and therefore ultimately succeeded to the Marquisate. The heirs to these great legislative, social, and moral inheritances, among the chief of which are the Spencer Earldom and the Bristol Marquisate, exert a vast influence in England, and we hope our countrymen will be ready to afford every facility to persons who have so laudable a desire for information.

(Boston Transcript.)

## WASHINGTON CITY.

SATURDAY EVENING, AUGUST 8, 1857.

**MR. HENRY M. LEWIS, Montgomery, Alabama,** is our general traveling agent for the States of Alabama and Tennessee, assisted by James O. Lewis and H. M. Lewis, Jr.

**MR. EDGAR E. JAMES, No. 322 South Tenth street, Philadelphia,** is our general traveling agent, assisted by Wm. H. Wade, John C. Jones, James D. Jones, J. H. Jones, R. S. Jones, T. D. Jones, H. Jones, E. W. Jones, Wm. L. Wadsworth, Jesse H. Canby, D. E. Jones, Mrs. F. E. Jones, T. A. Jones, and P. Davis.

**MR. C. C. JAMES, No. 1 Harrison street, Cincinnati, Ohio,** is our general collecting agent for the Western States and Texas, assisted by H. J. Thomas, William H. Thomas, Thomas M. James, Dr. A. L. Collins, James Morris, and Herman L. Laker. Receipts of others will be given.

## BRITISH INDIA.

It is impossible to contemplate the British empire in India, its vast extent, its numerous population, its immense wealth, and to look back upon the history of its acquisition, and the means by which it is held, without being filled with sentiments of admiration for the genius and courage of England. The history of the human race exhibits no spectacle of power comparable with it in sublimity. The little island of Great Britain—a mere outpost of the continent of Europe—rules with supreme authority the one hundred and fifty millions of the people of India; it rules them as conquered subjects; it rules them at the distance of ten thousand miles from the seat of authority; it rules them by force; and yet it rules them as it has conquered them, by the direct instrumentality of but a handful of Englishmen; for never, at any one moment, have there been in India sixty thousand men—civilians and soldiers included—of that ruling race of the islands of Great Britain and Ireland. It reminds one of the empire of Alexander. Yet that was the empire of but the lifetime of one man. It more nearly resembles the Roman empire. But, in the government of that, the Italian race, either as soldiers or civilians, were dispersed throughout the empire, and commanded and fought, as they governed, in actual person, in Asia and Africa, as well as in Europe. Not so in the case of England.

And now, at the very moment when England had seemed to be omnipotent in India; when, at the expiration of exactly one hundred years from the commencement of her conquests, she had become the apparent lord of the whole of India—the last of the great independent sovereignties, Aoudh, having been just annexed, and no considerable states remaining nominally independent, except Sindia in Gwalior, and the Nizam in the southern Deccan—just at this moment the power of England seems to be crumbling in her hands, as if threatened with instant dissolution.

How all this has happened—how the British empire in India was won, and how it now is half lost, and needs to be won over again—is a thing so curious and so instructive as to merit explanation.

One hundred years ago the Mogul descendants of Baber reigned in Delhi, nominally sovereigns of all India, with great subject feudatory princes exercising local authority—some of them Mohammedan, like the Emperor himself, and others of the native race of Hindostan. One European power after another—first Portugal, then Holland, and then France and England—had acquired factories and fortresses on the sea-coast for the purpose of commerce, in professed subjection to the government of Delhi. They had obtained foothold by playing off the resentments and passions of one part of India against another, fomenting the quarrels of the feudatory princes, and especially exciting the hostility of the chief native race, the Hindus, against their foreign masters, the Mohammedans. At that time England had less power in India than either Portugal, Holland, or France. But the genius of Clive and Warren Hastings, on the one hand, and the imbecility of Louis Fifteenth, on the other, enabled England to supplant France. And the battle of Plassey, by giving to her the control of Bengal and the commerce of the valley of the Ganges, conferred on her advantages, which, boldly and skillfully cultivated from occasion to occasion, have not only enabled her in the process of time to supplant her European rivals, but to substitute herself in the place of the Moguls as the avowed and admitted sovereign of all India.

The British dominion in India is one of conquest, then, acquired and maintained by the sword. It is pure military despotism; the despotism of a foreign conqueror, absorbing in his own hands all the power and wealth of the state.

To accomplish and maintain this conquest, England has not only deposed the native princes, one after another, but she has disfranchised the native races in a mass. We shall realize the condition of things in this respect in India if we reverse the case, and imagine a handful of Asiatics to have established themselves in Europe, and to rule its intelligent and cultivated millions as mere conquered subjects. For the millions of educated men in India—Hindu and Mohammedan—there is no public career suited to manly ambition. As civilians, they can aspire to no higher station than to be clerks and interpreters to an English collector or commissioner. As soldiers, they may serve in the ranks, or they may be nominally officers, but holding only subordinate rank under some beardless English cadet. But no Hindu or Mohammedan can command armies, rule states, or pursue any elevated career. How can such a state of things exist without universal discontent? How would it be in Europe, in the case supposed, if every royal family were dethroned, if all the nobles, all educated men, all persons who by wealth, rank, or character, were born or fitted for high pursuits, were thus trampled into indiscriminate equality of littleness, as the mere humble subjects of a foreign governor-general? That is the condition of the titled, the rich, the educated of all India.

But the titled, the rich, and the educated are but a small part of the population. Let us look for a moment at the condition of the industrial classes, the cultivators, the manufacturers, and the merchants. As to the cultivators, they are in the last degree of abjection, which it is possible for a foreign force to impose; for, by the celebrated settlement of Lord Hastings, the entire soil of India was confiscated and all its cultivators became the mere tenants at will of the government, which, in the place of tax, receives from them the rent of their land through the intermediate agency of a class of persons called zemindars, who are a kind of a middle man between the actual cultivators and the rackrent absentee landlord represented by England. As to the manufacturers, they who for centuries clothed all Europe with their cotton stuffs, their silks, and their shawls—the manufacturers are now driven to the wall, and deprived of their occupation, by being subjected to the forced competition of the looms of Manchester and Glasgow. And as to commerce, though multi-

ludes of wealthy merchants may be found, especially among the Parsees and Hindus, yet, after all, what fair play can the domestic commerce of India have had against the gigantic monopoly, first of the East India Company, and then of the whole body of the merchants of England?

It is said that, as compensation for all this, England has put an end to war among the native princes. It is true to a certain extent, she has done this—that is, by taking into her own hands the monopoly of war, in addition to the monopoly of agriculture, the monopoly of commerce, and the monopoly of manufactures. She has substituted British war in the place of Mohammedan war and Hindu war. But, after all, when the native princes of India were fighting among themselves, the productions and the revenues of the country were at least consumed in India; and if an Indian state or city were plundered, still the plunder was distributed among the people of India. But now the plunder of India, like its revenue and its productions, is continually drawn away from India itself to build up that stupendous structure of opulence which we see in England. The wealth of England is the impoverishment of India.

We thus perceive how it is that English conquest and English power in India operate with respect to the condition of the titled and the educated classes, and also how they operate with respect to the material interests of India. There remains another set of facts, concerning which the people of India are more sensitive than on the question either of power or wealth—and that is their religion. Throughout all vicissitudes England has maintained herself by skillfully avoiding any act calculated to give the least umbrage to the religious prejudices either of the Mohammedans or Hindus. But the jealousy of the people of India is at length aroused upon this point. Thus a lever is afforded to the discontent of the native nobles and of the ryots alike, by means of which to attack the very citadel of the power of England; for that power consists in the native troops, called Sipahis, levied by England in India—mercenaries—partly Mohammedans and partly high-caste Hindus. With her own troops alone England could neither have conquered nor can she hold India. With a well-appointed body of infantry, cavalry, and artillery of her own, she might overrun India as Alexander and as Nadir Shah had done before; but she could not hold it; she could only hold the spot upon which her troops might encamp; the millions of the population would close up behind her march as the sea does behind the track of a ship. She could waste and burn, but she could not conquer, subjugate, and govern. It is only by adding, to the twenty or thirty thousand of her own soldiers, the two, three, or four hundred thousand of soldiers whose she levies in India, that she can fight battles or even maintain police in that vast region of country, including, with the whole of India, nearly half of Indo-China. And it is with this great difficulty, the disaffection and mutiny of the native troops, the chief agents of her conquests and her power, that England now has to struggle.

But how, it may be asked, does it happen that just now, when the power of England is apparently at its apex, when she has to resume, as it were, the conquest of India? Why have the Sipahis mutinied in a body throughout the northern and northwestern provinces of India?

The immediate cause for this is in the fact of the issue to the troops of greased rifle cartridges, which have to be bitten by the soldiers when loading. The Mohammedans say that the cartridges are greased with hog's fat, to bite which violates their religious convictions. The Hindus say the cartridges are greased with tallow, to bite which is an act of sacrilege in them, and deprives them of caste. This fact is obviously the pretext merely, or the occasion rather, of the universal mutiny pervading the presidency of Bengal, and threatening to spread into Madras and Bombay. Accordingly, every careful observer looks behind this ostensible, for some real cause, or inducement of insurrection.

The war against Persia and that against China are spoken of as being the immediate occasion of the outbreak; for, say the Hindu Sipahis, when we have been marched or transported from India to Persia and China, we shall not only be subject to the immediate cause of loss of caste, the greased cartridges, but to other necessary incidents affecting caste on foreign service, and under circumstances depriving us of all power of self-defense or independent action. But this, again, does not wholly account for what has happened; for Sipahis troops were employed in Egypt against Napoleon, and more recently in China.

The English themselves, who are half insane on the subject of Russia, ascribe the outbreak to Russian intrigue. That is quite ridiculous. The Illustrated News repeats, with approbation, the remark of the Russians on this point, to the effect that, where admitted misgovernment and neglect suffice to account for the mutiny, it is quite unreasonable to seek for its origin in imputed intrigues of Russia. If there has been any foreign interference on the subject, it has been that of Persia. The Persian language is the language of diplomacy and of government in India. It has the same relation to public affairs in India that French has to public affairs in Europe. It is quite likely that Persia, attacked, as she conceived herself, injuriously by England, invaded and threatened with conquest, should have sought to raise a diversion against England by exciting disaffection in India.

The agents through whom to do this were at hand; and in the character of these persons we shall find the true explanation of the particular time of the present great insurrectionary movement in India.

Heretofore, each of the great accessions to the power of England in India has been a purely military operation. Bengal was conquered; the Carnatic was conquered; Mysore was conquered; the Deccan was conquered; Sind was conquered; the Sikhs were conquered. It was easy, in the act of conquest, to depose princes, disfranchise nobles, and strip the peasantry of their lands. The conquered submitted hopelessly to the fate of war. But the last great accession—the annexation of Aoudh—occurred in time of profound peace. It suited the Earl of Dalhousie, without any previous war, and simply because it suited him, to break all public faith to the most constantly loyal of the great native states of India. By a stroke of the pen the proud and martial Mohammedan nobles, the high-caste Shastras, the ambitious and intellectual Brahmins, of the great kingdom of Aoudh, were stripped of station, rank, and power, and reduced to the condition of mere disfranchised subjects of England. These men have watched their time for revenge, and have

taken it in the form most deadly to their wrongdoers. They were not prepared for war—perhaps they shrank from entering upon war against the apparently fatal supremacy of England. But they and their kindred constituted a large element of the Sipahi troops of the presidency of Bengal. They had ample opportunity and abundant motive to strike a blow at the very heart of British power by originating and inciting a general mutiny of the Sipahis. They have succeeded in this beyond their most sanguine expectations, and may be stimulated by the success of their first movement to follow it up by insurrection, and by civil war radiating from Aoudh throughout Upper India.

Sir Charles Napier warned his government that in the Sipahis, the apparent tower of strength, was really the weakness of England. But his warning went unheeded.

England has not borne herself meekly in the possession of her vast power. Forgetting that she sits at the sword's point one hundred and fifty millions of human beings, totally destitute of political rights, reduced by her to a condition of landless and hopeless servitude—forgetting all this, she foolishly gives herself over to a self-righteous pharisaism of hypocritical fault-finding at whatever there may be of inequality in the social condition of other countries, such as France, Italy, Austria, Russia, Brazil, and the United States—as if there were not in the monstrous fabric of her Indian empire a combination of all and more than all that there is of unequal and unjust in the social institutions of all the rest of Europe and America.

England has been blind to her own position, intermeddling right and left everywhere to pluck the mote from her brother's eye, regardless of the beam in her own. We trust that what is now occurring in India will teach her a lesson of moderation, forbearance, and modesty; for we wish her well. We should regret to see that magnificent empire of hers in the East go down in conflagration and carnage. That would be a calamitous catastrophe not surpassed even by the downfall of the Roman empire; and we are not prepared to say that under present circumstances it would be of any benefit even to the people of India themselves. We take pride in the genius, military and civil, which our own race, the men of our own blood and kindred, have displayed in the conquest and government of India. Nay, there is intimate relation between our own growth on the one hand in America and that of England on the other hand in Asia. It was only when England had come to despair of subjugating America that she started into greatness in Asia. And her generals, when beaten by us in the revolutionary war, redeemed themselves by new achievements, and under other names of Frank, in India.

## ELECTION RETURNS.

We go to press this evening without being able to furnish any election news in addition to the returns which appear in this morning's edition of the Union. This is exceedingly provoking; but we console ourselves with the reflection, founded upon the experience of years, that democratic victories travel very slowly.

The opposition claim with great confidence the election of their gubernatorial candidate in Missouri. As the claim is founded upon returns from fifty counties, and as there are nearly sixty more counties in the State to hear from, we can perceive no reason as yet to doubt the success of Col. Stewart, the democratic candidate for governor.

**NEW YORK DEMOCRATIC STATE CONVENTION.**  
The Albany Argus of Friday says: "The Democratic State committee met in this city yesterday. There was a good attendance, and the interchange of opinion was harmonious and cordial. After consultation it was agreed to call a State convention of one delegate from each assembly district, to meet at Syracuse on Thursday, the 10th day of September next." The Argus adds:

"The democrats of the State are now summoned to duty. The rallying call for the campaign has gone forth. We are prepared to see them respond to it with alacrity and energy. We hope to see them enter upon the duty of holding their primary meetings and district conventions in a spirit of entire harmony and cordiality among themselves, and of calm determination to redeem the State from the misrule which now runs riot, and from the bankruptcy and grievous taxation which threaten our citizens. A democratic victory this fall is within our reach, and